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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD RICHARDS and ANNETTE
RICHARDS, GEORGE Q. NIELSEN
and SHERRY NIELSEN, RONALD
HARRINGTON and MARY HARRINGTON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 14460

PINES RANCH, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH:
Comes now petitioner, Pines Ranch, Inc., a Utah corporation, and hereby respectfully requests a rehearing in the above
entitled cause and that the decision and opinion of this Honorable
Court filed herein on the 6th day of January, 1977, be reversed
for the reason that the Supreme Court has erred in the following
particulars:
POINT I: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF
THE OPINION, "THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAD CROSSED THE LAND
NOW OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT FOR APPROXIMATELY 40 YEARS."
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POINT II: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN THE OPINION
THAT REGULAR USE WAS NOT NECESSARY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AND THAT "ALL THAT IS REQUIRED
IS THAT THE USE BE AS OFTEN AS IS REQUIRED BY THE OWNER
OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE."
POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS UNABLE
TO SHOW THAT THE USE OVER THE YEARS PRIOR TO RECENT TIMES
WAS BY PERMISSION OF THE THEN OWNERS.
POINT IV: THE DECISION OF THE COURT REVERSING THIS CASE IS,
IN ANY EVENT, AMBIGUOUS.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action the plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment that they have a prescriptive easement to use an
alleged "road" across the defendant's property, and they further seek a restraining order preventing defendant from interfering with such use.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson, Sr., without a jury.

At the conclusion of plaintiffs'

evidence, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint, and
the Court took the motion under advisement.

At the conclusion

of the trial, the Court granted the aforesaid motion and judgment was entered dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.
(R-36 & 37.)
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court filed an opinion in this matter on
January 6, 1977.

Therein, the Supreme Court directed that "The

judgment rendered should be and is hereby reversed.
awarded to the plaintiffs."

Costs are

The opinion was written by Justice

Ellett (now Chief Justice) and concurred in by F. Henri Henriod,
Chief Justice; J. Allen Crockett, Justice; and D. Frank Wilkins,
Justice.

Justice Maughan filed a dissenting opinion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioner herein seeks a decision on rehearing affirming

the decision of the lower court, or that failing, for clarification
of the majority opinion filed in this action.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF
THE OPINION, "THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAD CROSSED THE LAND
NOW OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT FOR APPROXIMATELY FORTY YEARS."
In concluding that the evidence established that the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest had crossed the
land now owned by the defendant for approximately forty years,
we respectfully submit that the Supreme Court has apparently
relied upon the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, which was admitted
over objection of defendant at page 64 of the transcript.

The

said affidavit is clearly hearsay, and defendants were never
permitted any opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Gibbons. The
affidavit does not fit within any of the exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule as found in Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
the nearest exception being that found in Rule 63(4), which
provides for the admission of certain hearsay statements where
a declarant is unavailable as a witness, if the court finds
that the declaration "was made by the declarant at a time when
the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his
recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the
commencement of the action?".

In this instance, we respectfully

submit that there was no showing that the witness was unavailable as a witness, there being no testimony whatsoever on that
point; there was no testimony that the recollection of the
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declarant was clear, and the affidavit bearing the date of July 5,
1974, does not meet the qualification that it be a matter "recently
perceived" by the declarant inasmuch as it deals with matters allegedly occurring many, many years prior to 1974. Furthermore, the
said affidavit was made almost six months after the commencement of
this action, and thus fails to meet the final requirement of Rule
63(4).

To consider this affidavit as the basis for the decision of

the Court constitutes a taking of defendant's property without due
process of law and denies to defendant equal protection of the law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States and in violation of Article I, Section 7; Article
I, Section 2; Article I, Section 24; Article IV, Section 1 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
It should further be observed that by the undisputed evidence, the activities of the plaintiffs themselves on the property
commenced in 1961. The only evidence of use prior to 1961 was that
of the aforesaid Ethel Gibbons and of one Robert C. Walsh. Mr. Walsh
was not a predecessor in title of the plaintiffs.

He testified that

he went on the property from 1936 to 1952 once each year to get
Christmas trees. Thus, even if his testimony were considered persuasive and compelling, it would establish at most a right to
obtain a Christmas tree once a year and would not, indeed, establish the other activities as referred to in the second paragraph
of the Court's opinion, which were, in addition to the taking of
Christmas trees, the grazing of sheep, cutting timber, camping,
-5-
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holding picnics, horseback riding, etc.

It should further be

noted that there is a gap from 19 52 (the last year Mr. Walsh
testified that he got a Christmas tree - T-54) to 1961 when
plaintiff Nielsen testified he went on the property with the person from whom he purchased it. (T-10.) Even assuming that a
prescriptive easement can only be lost by a prohibition of use
for twenty years, as the opinion of the Supreme Court appears to
indicate, that is nevertheless not the issue presented by these
circumstances.

That rule only applies once the prescriptive ease-

ment has been acquired.

If the abandonment or non-use or inter-

ruption of use occurs prior to the establishment of the prescriptive
easement, there is no requirement that it be abandoned for "a like
period".

We respectfully submit that a nine-year interruption is

more than adequate to constitute an interruption in the activities
claimed for acquiring a prescriptive easement. Even accepting that
a prescriptive easement can be acquired without some use "each year",
which we assume may be the thrust of the citation of the Supreme
Court to 1 Thompson on Real Property, Specific Easement, Section
464, page 575 (1924), nonetheless we submit that that citation is
a long ways from indicating that nine years of non-use is not fatal
to the acquisition of a prescriptive easement.
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POINT II: THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING IN THE OPINION
THAT REGULAR USE WAS NOT NECESSARY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AND THAT "ALL THAT IS REQUIRED
IS THAT THE USE BE AS OFTEN AS IS REQUIRED BY THE OWNER
OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE."
We do not think the trial court intended, by the use of
the word "regular", to indicate that the use asserted as a basis
for prescriptive easement must occur at specified timed intervals
or with any particular rhythm, nor do we contend that that is a
requirement.

We believe the trial court was using the word "regu-

lar" as essentially synonymous with "continuous". We respectfully
submit that the word is commonly used this way.

For example, a

"regular customer" is one who frequents a given establishment
continuously.

We, therefore, feel that the use of the word "regu-

lar" should not be fatal to the trial court's finding. Furthermore,
we respectfully submit that the statement that "all that is required
is that the use be as often as is required by the owner of the dominant estate" does not state the law and, indeed, would constitute a
very unworkable principle of law.

If taken at face value, that state-

ment found in the opinion of the Supreme Court, would permit practically any use, however infrequent, to constitute a basis for a
prescriptive easement. A party could establish a prescriptive easement across a given tract by one solitary use over a span of twenty
years by testifying that he only "needed"to use it that one time.
We respectfully refer the Court again to the citation set out at
page 22 of respondent's brief, to-wit, 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements,
Section 56, where it states that a prescriptive easement cannot be
acquired by "occasional and sporadic acts for temporary purposes."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS UNABLE
TO SHOW THAT THE USE OVER THE YEARS PRIOR TO RECENT TIMES
WAS BY PERMISSION OF THE THEN OWNERS,
This matter was dealt with in Point II of Respondent's
brief, and although we believe that a fair reading of that Point
(which sets out seven separate illustrations of permissive use)
demonstrates permissive use, we wish at this time to particularly
emphasize the following:
Defendant's witness, Rogerson, testified that prior to
the 1960!s, no one entered the property without permission.

If

persons were found on the premises without permission, they were
"kicked off". (T-113.) And, of course, since the mid-60's, no
twenty-year period has yet elapsed.

Even if this case is deemed

an equity case, giving the Supreme Court the right to disregard
the findings of the trial judge, we submit that the long established policy of the Supreme Court is to the effect that that
should rarely and sparingly be done.

In the dissenting opinion

in this case, Justice Maughan quoted from Del Porto vs. Nicolo,
27 Utah 2d 286, 495 Pac 2d 811 (1972) as follows:
" . . . Due the the advantage position of the trial
court, in close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, there is indulged a presumtion of correctness
of his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the
appellant to show they were in errror; and where the
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings merely
because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but
do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against them."
Vie respectfully submit that there is nothing that appears
in the record that would serve as a basis for disregarding the
testimony of Rogerson as being untrustworthy or inaccurate. Indeec
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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other than plaintiffs' witness, Walsh, Rogerson is the only witness
called by either side having any knowledge of events prior to
plaintiffs' coming on the scene. His evidence, therefore, instead
of being disregarded, ought, it would seem, to be given considerable weight rather than to be disregarded in favor of the hearsay
statements contained in the affidavit, of Mrs. Ethel Gibbons, which,
as we have stated above, appears to us to be the only evidence that
could be deemed contradictary to that of Mr. Rogerson. The testimony of Walsh, we respectfully submit, is not necessarily contradictory to that of Rogerson inasmuch as one trip per year to the
premises in the wintertime is an activity which is not likely to
be discovered, at least for a considerable period of time, other
than purely upon the occasion

of a chance meeting.

We, therefore,

submit that the testimony of Rogerson should not be disregarded
and, if believed, it would establish that any prior use was indeed
permissive.

It would certainly further constitute an interruption

in any claim to continuous, adverse use so as to prevent the same
from accruing to the benefit of the plaintiffs or their successors.

~9_
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POINT IV: THE DECISION OF THE COURT REVERSING THIS CASE IS,
IN ANY EVENT, AMBIGUOUS.
In this case, assuming that the Supreme Court refuses
to reverse its ruling, the decision of the Supreme Court is as
follows:
"The judgment rendered should be and is hereby reversed."
The judgment of the court was that the Complaint of the plaintiff
be dismissed with prejudice.

We take it then at this point that

there is no judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice, or otherwise, and indeed, there is no
judgment of the lower court at all. Under principles announced
by this Court in the case of Cobb vs. Snow, 14 Utah 2d 170, 380 Pac
2d 457 (1963), the case is to be deemed before the District Court
as though no judgment had been entered, leaving the District Court
free at that point to undertake such proceedings as are just and
proper and as are not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme
Court in this matter. We further take it that that might include
taking further evidence, if necessary, and in any event to resolve
what we take to be questions propounded by this Court in the third
to last paragraph of the main opinion, to-wit:

(1) That the lower

court determine whether or not the plaintiffs crossed the land now
owned by the defendant by a way which can be located on the ground
and if that is answered in the affirmative by the trial court for
determination of the location of that right-of-way sufficient to
enable the same to be described in the final decree in this mattei

-10-
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In that connection we cite the Court the case of Bart's Body
Shop, Inc., vs. Hageman, 536 Pac 2d 1150, a 1975 Colorado case,
in which the court stated that an accurate legal description
should be ascertained before a proper decree could be entered.
In the instant case, such a definite finding was not required by
the trial court because of the trial courtfs disposition of the
case in favor of the defendant.

(2) That the trial court deter-

mine whether the plaintiffs did, in fact, cross the land of the
defendant whenever they desired and as a right, and we take it
further that the trial court will have to determine the questions
raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan, to-wit, which
one of the eight subdivided tracts of five acres each is contiquous with the aforesaid right-of-way when finally determined as to
location by the trial judge, and a determination of the nature of
the use established in the past as it relates to future use. This
Court, having indicated in the main opinion that, "While the use
made, could limit the future use, it does not entirely prevent a
prescriptive use to cross the defendant's land." It appears that such
determinations are in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits inasmuch as the plaintiffs have subdivided the forty acres for the
purpose of establishing cabin sites, and that use has.never been
established by plaintiffs or any of their predecessors under any
view of this case.

-n-
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We respectfully submit that the foregoing conclusions

on the part of respondents are fairly taken and will be urged in
the lower court, and if the same are in any way not in accord
with the opinion of this Court, we would respectfully request
the assistance of the Court in clarifying these matters prior
to further proceedings in the lower court.

^

It should also be noted that Judge Stewart M. Hanson,
Sr., has retired since the trial on this case, which indicates
that further clarification may be not only helpful, but necessary.
CONCLUSION
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the decision
of the trial court was correct and that the Complaint of the
plaintiffs was properly dismissed.

We feel that the Supreme

Court, in reaching its decision, of necessity relied upon the
affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, which was admitted over defendant's
objection and is hearsay and totally inadmissible; and further,
the Supreme Court has misconstrued the law and has announced a
rule which, we feel, is totally unworkable. We feel that the
Supreme Court has further erred in determining that prior use
by plaintiffs or their predecessors was permissive in any event.
If the Supreme Court shall decline to reverse its decision, we
respectfully submit that in the administration of the interests
of justice, a rehearing should be granted to clarify the numerous

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-l ?J..-Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

problems which the decision of the Supreme Court leaves yet to
be decided.
DATED this

day of January, 1977.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent

Mailed two copies of the foregoing Petition and Brief
to Richard Richards, attorney for plaintiffs and appellants, at
his address, 2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah
prepaid, the

84401, postage

day of January, 1977.

Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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